This paper estimates the effects of several American law firms' international networks of offices on the total value of overseas mergers and acquisitions (M&A) by US corporations. Nowdays many nations can review proposed mergers and US law firms help clients overcome such regulatory hurdles, effectively greasing the market for corporate control. However, they can also oppose transactions that are inimical to their clients' interests. I present evidence that suggests that Baker & McKenzie-the US law firm with the most overseas offices-has facilitated such transactions, whereas the combined effect of the next five largest American law firms has tended to reduce such M&A.
1.

Introduction
In recent years there has been considerable interest in the means by which groups of market participants interact so as to facilitate various forms of international commerce. Particular emphasis has been given in this research program to mechanisms to locate potential buyers and sellers and to overcome contract enforcement problems (Rauch, 2002; and Rauch and Casella, forthcoming) . Given the considerable growth in international trade flows since 1985, especially in the pan-Pacific region where Chinese business groups operate extensively, it is perhaps not surprising that research into such mechanisms has gathered pace (see, for example, Rauch and Trindade, 2002 .)
The late 1990s witnessed a surge in one form of international commerce that has received considerably less attention from international economists: a global wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&A).
2 What is more, since the 1980s-that is, well before the latest M&A wave-leading law firms have been expanding their presence outside their home jurisdictions, creating networks of legal professionals to advise corporations as they take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the current era of international market integration. This paper explores whether there is a connection between these two phenomena; that is, whether the formation of such global law firms has helped contribute to overseas US M&A activity during 1999, one of the boom years in the latest wave of crossborder M&A.
The causal links between the presence of global legal networks and transactions in the international market for corporate assets are potentially different from those traditionally emphasized in studies of international trade flows; the latter stressing the roles of search costs, asymmetries of information, and contract enforcement costs. A feature of transactions in the market for corporate control is that purchases and sales of firms often involve review by and approval by national competition or antitrust authorities. These review processes not only erect a potential barrier to M&A transactions but they also create demand for the very services of intermediaries-such as law firms and economic consultancies-whose actions may influence the outcome of these official investigations.
In a multi-country world a merger of two firms may require the approval of many national authorities. For example, the merger between Price Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand, announced on September 17, 1997, required approval in the United States, by the European Commission, in Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and Switzerland-to name some, and by no means all, of the jurisdictions involved (Kolasky, 2000) . Law firms with a global imprint can and do help clients to obtain clearances from national antitrust authorities for mergers and takeovers with international ramifications. Familiarity with both the clients needs and with numerous national merger review procedures are the means by which global law firms can add grease to the international market for corporate assets.
Another feature of merger review procedures is that some jurisdictions appear to
give rival firms greater opportunities to present evidence against a proposed merger than others. It is often claimed that the European Commission's merger review procedure gives opponents to a proposed merger a greater role than in comparable U.S. proceedings (Boeder, 2000; Venit and Kolasky, 2000) ; a point that was made with particular force by some in the aftermath of the European
Commission's decisions on the proposed Boeing-McDonnell Douglas and
General Electric-Honeywell mergers. To the extent that this is true, global law firms can throw sand into the wheels of this form of international commerce by presenting evidence against proposed transactions that are inimical to their clients' interests. 3 A priori, then, it is unclear whether the existence of global legal networks has facilitated or retarded cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
A rich dataset of the overseas presence of 100 US law firms in 1997 is employed
here to examine whether their geographical reach across national borders correlates with the pattern of overseas M&A by US corporations in 1999.
Controlling for the other plausible determinants of international M&A activity (such as distance from the United States, national income and corporate tax rates of the overseas jurisdiction), I examine whether the presence of six large US law firms, which together account for 60 percent of the employment of US lawyers in the foreign countries considered in my empirical analysis, have contributed to the observed level of overseas M&A activity by US corporations in 1999. In addition, as merger notification requirements and reviews tend to apply more strictly to relatively larger M&A transactions, I examine whether the presence of these six US law firms increases the mean size of recorded crossborder M&A transactions.
The principal finding is that the presence in a country of the US law firm with the greatest global footprint (Baker & McKenzie) substantially raises the total value of US M&A activity in that jurisdiction. In contrast, the presence in a country of five other US law firms with large overseas operations tends to reduce both the total value and mean size of M&A transactions in an economy. On net, however, the geographical allocation of these six law firms' offices is such that US M&A activity into many non-G7 economies, including several relatively fast growing developing economies, is double what would have otherwise occurred. This implies that the global presence of at least one major US law firm has brought 3 It is worth pointing out that relatively few mergers are publicly opposed or rejected by national competition agencies. Often, officials make their opposition known in the early stages of a merger review, so giving the merging parties an opportunity to withdraw their merger. In other cases, officials signal their opposition during informal meetings (or "soundings") before a merger is proposed. Both types of official opposition may well be encouraged by the evidence provided by legal advisers to rivals to the merging parties. In fact, the number of publicly rejected mergers is a fraction of the planned mergers that are not consummated. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section I summarize the key aspects of the boom in global M&A activity in the mid-to-late 1990s, and the growth of US law firms' operations since 1985. In section three, the econometric strategy and data employed are described, as are the estimation results. A discussion of these findings, with suggestions for future research, are presented in section four.
The late 1990s boom in cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the international expansion of US law firms
The 1990s saw a ten-fold real increase in the value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. According to OECD (2001) , over a trillion US dollars of corporate assets were involved in cross-border M&A in the year 2000. Unlike the surge in cross-border M&A in the late 1980s, the latest wave was not confined principally to transactions between British and American firms. Continental European, Japanese, Korean, Latin American, and South East Asian firms played significant roles in what has been termed by some as the first "global" wave of mergers and acquisitions (Black, 2000) . Figure 1 provides evidence on the extent of US outward M&A activity, and shows that US purchases of corporate assets abroad trebled in real terms between 1995 and 1999. 4 For distinct empirical analysis of the effects of merger review regimes see Evenett (2002 Evenett, Lehmann, and Steil, 2000) . This further adds to the demand for legal intermediaries and puts at a premium the ability to coordinate in a coherent manner merger clearance procedures across many jurisdictions. 7 The spread of such merger review laws is now so pronounced that one leading U.S. law firm, White & Case, prepares an annual compilation of national merger review procedures and extensively comments on the latest legal developments in this regard. See White & Case (2001) .
reviewed by many national antitrust authorities; and depending on the statutes governing these authorities' powers, the latter can reject such a proposed merger outright or, as is more common, can demand divestitures or other commitments from the parties involved. In some countries, in particular those with federal constitutions such as the United States, sub-national antitrust authorities may add to the number of reviewing bodies. An interesting question is whether the cumulative effect of these reviews is to erect a considerable barrier to international mergers and acquisitions, that is, to the international trade in corporate assets.
Multi-jurisdictional merger review has considerably expanded the demand for legal services on two accounts. First, firms seeking approval for their proposed M&A transactions need specialized counsel in (at least) each of the major jurisdictions, and need to coordinate their counsel's responses so that any concessions (or agreements reached with antitrust authorities) do not jeopardize the commercial viability of the transaction. Second, firms opposed to a rivals' announced plans to merge or acquire assets abroad can hire legal counsel to present evidence to antitrust authorities that casts the proposed transaction in a poor light. 8 Some antitrust legal practitioners refer to this practice as "forum shopping"; the pursuit of jurisdictions that are sympathetic to firms opposed to a merger. Again, such practices often need to be coordinated so as to maximize the probability that a sufficiently large number of antitrust authorities take steps to oppose enough components of a proposed deal that it is eventually abandoned.
As noted earlier, the receptiveness of antitrust authorities to evidence presented by rival firms varies considerably across jurisdictions and may well be greater in jurisdictions with nascent or younger merger review procedures.
8 It should be noted that there are, in principle, circumstances under which the rivals to two or more merging firms would support-rather than oppose-the proposed merger. A merger between firms in the same market that does not result in lower marginal costs for the merged firm could well benefit rivals as the intensity of competition may well attenuate after the merger.
One supply side response to this increased demand for specialist antitrust counsel in many jurisdictions has been the formation of M&A practice areas in global law firms. Such firms almost always started out serving either the US or the British national market. As far as US law firms are concerned, Spar (1997) identifies two These large global law firms were in place well before the global merger wave took off in the late 1990s. By 1989, the 250 largest US law firms had 180 overseas offices (Spar, 1997) . This growth continued through the 1990s. A recent analysis revealed that in 1997 the top 100 US law firms had 363 overseas offices employing 4214 lawyers (Beaverstock, Smith, and Taylor, 2000 I will now summarize some of the main arguments of this section. Global legal networks expanded before the latest wave of cross-border M&A. The presence of a man-made impediment to trade in corporate assets-merger review procedures-provides these networks with a means to hamper or to facilitate cross-border M&A, and distinguishes these networks from the existing literature on business networks which emphasizes the latters' role in promoting international trade in goods and services. The remainder of this paper is devoted to examining whether there is any empirical evidence that the global footprint of several leading US law firms facilitated or reduced US overseas M&A activity in 1999, a year when the latest wave of global M&A was in full swing.
Econometric strategy and data employed
Given that many factors which are unrelated to the presence of legal intermediaries can influence the amount of US cross-border M&A in a foreign 9 For an account of the worldwide expansion of Baker & McKenzie see Bauman (1999 The gravity equation approach posits that the value of the economic transactions between two entities depends on each body's economic mass and the distance between them (Anderson, 1979 , Deardorff, 1998 , and Evenett and Keller, 2002 In this context, this amounts to assuming that the distance between a foreign nation and the United States and the former's national income are candidate 11 Eliminating these three territories leaves 49 economies in my dataset. The 49 economies are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Hong Kong PRC, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela. determinants of the total value of US cross-border M&A taking place in that nation. 12 The intuition is that a larger foreign market provides, other things being equal, greater sales opportunities for US firms and their subsidiaries; and that greater distance from the United States makes running a foreign subsidiary or acquisition more difficult and so detracts from the desirability of buying or merging with that nation's firms. Data on the 49 economies' gross domestic products was taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators CD-ROM. Following standard practice, the distance from Washington, D.C., to the administrative capital of each economy was used as the proxy for distance from the United States.
Three other control variables were employed. The first is a proxy for the retained corporate profit rate (that is, the proportion of a firm's profits that it can expect to keep after paying taxes and other government-assessed fees and levies.)
Economies which have higher retained profit rates are hypothesized to be more desirable places to undertake cross-border M&A. I proxy for this rate with one minus the maximum corporate tax rate charged in an economy, which too is available in the World Development Indicators database. The second control variable is the foreign economy's tariff rate. The logic here is that higher tariffs reduce the profitability of exporting to an economy and enhance the attractiveness of establishing local subsidiaries. However, an alternative hypothesis is that national tariff rates proxy for the degree of policy-induced internal and external distortions to an economy, and to the extent that such internal distortions reduce the profitability of firms, this will discourage crossborder M&A. 13 I took the average tariff rate as the proxy for the restrictiveness of a nation's trade barriers, data which too is available on the World Development 12 Strictly speaking the gravity equation approach suggests that the level of US national income is a determinant too of the value of outward US cross-border M&A. However, the fact that my dataset contains information on such cross-border M&A transactions for one year (1999) means that the level of US national income cannot account for the variation in the value of M&A received across different foreign economies. Consequently, I do not include US national income as an explanatory variable in my econometric analysis. 13 In the context of the cross-country growth literature, Xavier Sala-I-Martin has forcefully argued that national tariff rates can proxy for both internal and external barriers to economic exchange.
Indicators CD-ROM. The final control variable is whether a country has a British colonial heritage. This could be important for two reasons. First, in an economy with such a heritage English is more likely to be the language of business, making it easier for a US firm to run any corporation it acquires in that economy.
Second, the likelihood that an economy has a common law system is greater if it was at some point a British colony-and this is precisely the system that operates in the United States and is familiar to US lawyers. Both conjectures suggest that having a British colonial heritage will raise the amount of US crossborder M&A. A dummy variable is introduced to capture this effect (taking the value of one if the economy has such a heritage.)
The first antitrust-related variable employed in the empirical analysis is whether the foreign economy has a merger notification scheme or merger review procedure. As argued in the last section, such schemes and reviews are likely to Before describing the first econometric specification employed it will be helpful to introduce the following notation:
14 One conference participant suggested that all of the EU members in my sample should be aggregated into a single entity because mergers in these economies can be, in principle, reviewed by a single body (the European Commission). While it is the case that these EU members are similar in this respect, the values of the control variables (such as distance, retained corporate tax rates, and alike) differ markedly across these economies; and such variation is helpful in identifying the effect of such control variables on cross-border M&A. It is also the case that some of the mergers in EU economies are reviewed by national competition authorities.
MA i
Denotes the total value of US cross-border M&A into economy i in 1999. where ln(X) is the natural logarithm of a variable X and 6 1 ,..., β β are parameters to be estimated. The first specification takes the total value of US cross-border M&A as the dependent variable, and the second specification takes the mean value of US cross-border M&A as the dependent variable. Concerns about heteroskedacity which are common in cross-sectional samples (such as the ones analysed here) resulted in a two step estimation procedure being employed. In the first step, each specification was estimated using ordinary least squares and the absolute value of the regression residuals i e were recovered. The latter were used to weight each observation and the specifications were re-estimated.
The full set of parameter estimates and their associated p-values are reported in Table 2 for the regression with the total value of M&A activity as the dependent variable, and in Table 3 for the specification where the mean value of M&A transactions was the dependent variable.
Examining the third and fourth columns of these two tables it is clear that the Table   4 .) The vast scale of Baker & McKenzie's overseas operations is apparent-this US law firm operated in 30 of the 49 economies in my sample and employed 1743 lawyers (see Table 4 and Figure 2 ). For the purposes of exposition I refer to these six US law firms as the "Big 6" firms, and the goal of the remaining empirical analysis is to estimate the contribution of the presence of these six legal networks within a jurisdiction to the amount of US M&A that takes place in that jurisdiction.
It is important to differentiate between the presence of these six law firms and the Tables 2 and 3 .
Interestingly, the inclusion of these terms produces-for the first time-negative and statistically significant coefficients for the presence of a merger notification scheme. The latter coefficients imply that merger review procedures reduce the mean value of US M&A transactions by approximately 50 percent, a sizeable economic impact.
The inclusion of these two network terms in specification 5 does suggest that these global legal networks significantly affect the extent of US cross-border
M&A. It appears that having a large Baker & McKenzie office in a country substantially boosts the total value of US cross-border M&A in that country, but does not increase-at any recognized level of statistical significance-the mean value of such M&A transactions. In contrast, the effect of the presence of the other Big Six firms reduces the total value and the mean value of cross-border M&A undertaken by US corporations in a jurisdiction. The parameter estimates in A better sense of the net effect of these six legal networks on US cross-border M&A can be found in Table 5 . markets then the effects may not be so benign.
Summary and implications for future research
Much of the existing literature on the effects of networks on trade has emphasized the trade-facilitating aspects of network formation. In this paper I have considered the effects of global legal networks where a proiri one cannot be certain that their presence has greased the wheels of one form of international commerce, cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Tables 2 and 3 were used to calculate these forecasts
